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Abstract
The paper analyses the determinants and short-term effects of labour market reforms,
using information from a novel policy compendium that covers 110 developed
and developing economies between 2008 and 2014. We find that the approval of
reforms is positively associated with the unemployment rate, the simultaneous
implementation of fiscal consolidation measures and the presence of a fixed
exchange rate regime. Differences in the results are explored by looking at the
direction of reforms (i.e. increasing or decreasing legislation), temporal horizon (i.e.
temporary or permanent measures) and coverage (i.e. complete or two-tier
reforms); while also analysing separately reforms’ determinants across domains of
labour legislation (e.g. permanent contracts, collective dismissals). Finally, we find that
deregulatory labour market reforms tend to increase the unemployment rate in the short
run when they are approved during contractionary periods—while they have a
non-significant effect when approved during periods of economic stability or expansion.
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1 Introduction
Reforms of labour legislation have been amongst the most widely spread policy inter-
ventions used by governments in recent years in order to address the negative effects
of the global financial and economic crisis. In developed economies, labour market le-
gislation reforms have been perceived as useful instruments to sustain employment
levels in times of rising unemployment rates and limited public resources (OECD
2012). In developing countries, the attention towards labour market legislation has
mostly concerned the need to protect workers against shocks in labour demand result-
ing from fluctuations in international trade (ILO 2015a). In both cases, policy interven-
tions have differed with respect to their (i) motivation (e.g. enhance competitiveness or
kick-start job creation); (ii) direction (e.g. increasing or decreasing protection); and (iii)
area of intervention (e.g. permanent or temporary workers, collective bargaining).
This variation raises questions about the determinants of labour market reforms as
well as about the effectiveness of these reforms in improving labour market outcomes.
In an effort to better understand these developments, we build a novel compendium of
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labour market reforms that covers 110 advanced and developing economies for the
period between 2008 and 2014. To our knowledge, this represents one of the most
comprehensive attempts to map changes in labour market legislation during the cri-
sis—both in terms of countries covered as well as areas of employment legislation. A
descriptive analysis based on the data in our compendium shows that reform intensity
has increased during the first phase of the recession, reaching a peak in 2012. Between
2012 and 2014 the average number of reforms passed annually decreased, matching
levels that characterized the pre-crisis period. Moreover, the majority of reforms have de-
creased existing levels of regulation—although large disparities are registered across geo-
graphical regions and policy subdomains. Reforms of permanent contracts have been at the
centre of the attention of policymakers in developed economies, while governments in de-
veloping economies have primarily reformed collective bargaining institutions. Finally, the
majority of reforms have been of permanent (rather than temporary) nature and they have
targeted the entire eligible population (rather than specific subgroups).
Drawing on our compendium of labour market reforms, the purpose of the paper is
twofold. First, it seeks to explain determinants of reforms’ approval. The results of the
analysis show that high and increasing unemployment rates have positively affected the
probability of adopting labour market reforms. At the same time, the approval of reforms
is positively associated with the simultaneous implementation of fiscal consolidation mea-
sures as well as the presence of a fixed exchange rate regime. These results partially con-
firm the findings from earlier studies (Turrini et al. 2015; Duval and Elmeskov 2006; Høj
et al. 2006), while expanding their geographical coverage. The paper then examines the
determinants of labour market reforms across policy directions (i.e. increasing or decreas-
ing legislation), temporal horizon (i.e. temporary or permanent measure) and coverage
(i.e. complete or two-tier intervention). Furthermore, it also examines the different labour
market subdomains where reforms have been implemented. Our results show that deter-
minants of labour market reforms approved between 2008 and 2014 do indeed differ
across these dimensions, thus providing new insights to the existing literature. Finally, we
examine the short-term effects of labour market reforms on unemployment rates. In the
baseline specification, we find no effects of either a reduction or an increase in labour
market regulation on changes in unemployment. However, when analysing the effects of
reforms at different points of the business cycle, the results reveal that deregulatory labour
market reforms increase the unemployment rate in the short run when they are approved
during crises—while not having a statistically significant effect if they are implemented
during periods of economic stability or expansion. These results are in line with the previ-
ous literature which argues that structural reforms might have unintended consequences
when implemented during economic crises (Cacciatore et al. 2012; Bouis et al. 2012).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the method-
ology used to compile the policy compendium and presents the main reform trends de-
rived from it. Section 3 discusses the empirical results looking at the determinants
(Section 3.1) and short-term effects (Section 3.2) of labour market reforms. Section 4
summarizes our findings and concludes.
2 Changes to labour market regulation around the world (2008–14)
The paper uses information on labour market reforms collected in a novel policy com-
pendium that covers 110 developed and developing economies between 2008 and 2014.
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The methodology used to compile and code the data follows previous work in this field
(e.g. Turrini et al. 2015), while being adapted to the wider geographical coverage (i.e.
developed and developing economies) and the narrower area of research interest (i.e.
employment protection). In particular, the main sources of information are represented
by the ILO employment protection legislation database (EPLex) and the ILO database
of national labour, social security and related human rights legislation (NATLEX).
These are the two most comprehensive inventories of labour legislation with a global
coverage, presenting detailed and comparable information on the state of labour legisla-
tion in both developed and developing countries. In order to ensure that our coding of
reforms is consistent with the data used in previous studies (Turrini et al. 2015; Boeri
2011), the information collected from the ILO databases is complemented and cross-
checked with the data available in the EU Commission database on labour market re-
forms (LABREF) and the social reforms database of the Fondazione Rodolfo Debene-
detti (fRDB) and IZA. Additionally, in order to limit the risk of missing information
(especially for developing countries, for which ILO databases might be updated less
regularly), we have complemented the data sources discussed above with information
coming from official national and international reports (ILO 2012).1 For every policy
intervention that is identified through this mapping exercise, the compendium provides
a brief description of the content of the legislative change, the year of its approval and
implementation (if they differ) and the labour legislation policy subdomain to which
the change applies. In particular, the compendium distinguishes between changes in
the legislation of (i) permanent employment contracts; (ii) temporary employment con-
tracts; (iii) other forms of employment (e.g. teleworkers, dependent self-employees); (iv)
collective bargaining institutions; (v) collective dismissals; and (vi) working hours. This
classification represents an expansion compared to the traditional understanding of
employment protection legislation (EPL) (i.e. permanent contracts, temporary con-
tracts and collective dismissals), which is motivated by the attempt to include pol-
icy changes that are more likely to occur during periods of economic downturns
(e.g. working hours) as well as to better account for reform efforts that cover
emerging forms of work (ILO 2015b). However, for parsimony, we cannot include
all areas of labour legislation and important subdomains (e.g. anti-discrimination)
remain uncovered. If different changes to labour market regulation were passed
within a single reform package (e.g. changes in both notice period and severance
payments for permanent contracts), these interventions are coded separately. Fur-
thermore, since legislatives do not usually pass single-issue policy reforms, but ra-
ther complex packages that impact various subdomains of labour legislation, these
packages are broken down by subdomain as well as by the number of changes
passed in a particular subdomain. For example, the 2012 Spanish labour market re-
form (Law 3/2012) introduced substantial changes across different labour market
areas (e.g. permanent contracts and collective bargaining). In order to correctly
code the reform, the overall reform package has been first differentiated by policy
subdomain and then within each subdomain, every change has been identified sep-
arately. As a result, the compendium records a total number of 18 changes in the
legislation that are connected to the Spanish reform of 2012. As such, the term
“reform” in the present study should read as indicating a single change in the leg-
islation—rather than a full-fledged reform.
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Despite the fact that this coding procedure aims at minimizing the issues related to
the variation in the importance of reforms, it is still limited in addressing some of the
structural shortcomings connected with the use of count data. In particular, higher
counts for a particular country or policy subdomain do not necessarily reflect that
more extensive or effective policies are being adopted by governments (Turrini et al.
2015). For instance, a gradualist reform approach would be incorrectly interpreted as a
sign of policy activism compared to an abrupt single change to the legislation. Similarly,
policy reversals could inflate the number of interventions registered in the compen-
dium. Different methods have been developed in the literature to deal with this prob-
lem. For instance, Kucera (2007) obtains indexes of trade union rights’ violations after
having created a matrix that assigns different weights to each type of violation that is
reported in international data sources (e.g. the murder or disappearance of union mem-
bers is assigned the highest weight). Despite providing an intuitive answer to the prob-
lem faced by count data, this methodology strongly relies on arbitrary decisions on the
weights to be assigned—which entirely depend on the “author’s sense of the severity of
each violation” (Teitelbaum 2010). For our purposes, this coding strategy would make
this type of exercise extremely difficult due to the variation of labour market reforms
present in the compendium as well as their different impacts depending on the country
situation in which they intervene. In order to limit the arbitrary nature of this weight-
ing scheme, Teitelbaum (2010) uses item response theory to understand whether the
different count items at the centre of the analysis (i.e. in this case, policy reforms) relate
to the same latent concept. This methodology provides a more objective basis to con-
struct an overall indicator of interest, but it still would not provide an insight on the
different nature and scope of the policy interventions (i.e. treating them equally). For
this reason, we follow the methodology proposed by Boeri (2011) and introduce dum-
mies to code labour market reforms along several dimensions. In particular, for each re-
form, we note (i) the direction of the intervention (i.e. increasing or decreasing
legislation); (ii) its temporal horizon (i.e. temporary measure or permanent change in
the legislation); and (iii) its coverage/target group as a share of the eligible population
(i.e. complete reforms targeting the majority of the eligible population or two-tier re-
forms applying only to a subgroup).2 Although our method seeks to minimize the
amount of subjective decisions to be made when coding labour market reforms, some
degree of subjectivity remains. For example, reforms that have increased the ability of
employers to adjust working hours have been coded in the compendium as deregula-
tory interventions—although in some circumstances, these were (either directly or in-
directly) aimed at avoiding layoffs. However, the benefits connected to the
identification of these reforms’ characteristics seem to largely outpace the possible
shortcomings. Additionally, the coding decisions, although in some cases subjective,
are consistently used and can be replicated. In particular, we test the different coding
procedures followed in this paper against the measures of accuracy of qualitative indi-
cators proposed by Bollen and Paxton (2000).3
Our data shows that a total number of 642 changes to labour regulation have been
approved in the 110 countries investigated between 2008 and 2014.4 The number of
changes approved every year has increased globally in the first phase of the
downturn—going from 61 interventions approved in 2008 to a peak of 147 changes
in 2012. After 2012 reform intensity has decreased, broadly following trends in
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unemployment rates (see Fig. 1 for details by geographical region). The majority of
the interventions (55 %) have brought about a decrease in existing levels of regula-
tion. This stems from a general trend towards deregulation registered in developed
Fig. 1 Regional unemployment rate (right axis) and number of reforms by year and direction (left axis).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ILO GET database (unemployment rate) and ILO EPLex and
NATLEX databases, EU Commission LABREF and fRDB-IZA database of social reforms (number of reforms)
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economies—and in particular in EU member states—and a reinforcement of labour
legislation in developing countries. In particular, the share of reforms decreasing
employment protection has been equal to 66 % of the total in Developed Economies
and the EU and 46 % in Central and South-Eastern Europe (CEES) and the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS)(see Appendix 2 for the list of countries in-
cluded in each region). As Fig. 2 shows, all other regions have registered lower
shares of reforms aimed at decreasing employment protection, ranging between
38 % (East Asia) and 15 % (North Africa and the Middle East). Furthermore, the
majority of the reforms have targeted the entire population, with 69 % of reforms
being complete and the remaining 31 % being two-tier reforms. In addition, 92 % of
the reforms constitute permanent changes in labour market legislation—which sug-
gests that the crisis led to a long-term shift in labour market regulation around the
world. Overall, our descriptive results match the trends described by traditional in-
dicators of EPL, including the OECD indicator and the Cambridge University
Centre for Business Research’s Labour Regulation Index (CB-LRI) indicator (ILO
2015a).
Looking at labour market reforms by policy subdomain shows that the majority of
the reforms have been approved in the areas of permanent contracts (30 %) and col-
lective bargaining (27 %), followed by reforms on temporary employment contracts
(13 %) and working hours (12 %). Relatively less attention has been paid to changes
in the legislation of other forms of work and collective dismissals (10 and 8 % of the
total, respectively). Overall, large disparities in reform intensity by policy subdomain
are registered across regions (see Fig. 3). In particular, Developed Economies and
the EU and countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe and the CIS have been
mostly concerned with reforms in legislation regarding permanent contracts. Exam-
ples include the modification of the legislation over severance payments and notice
periods for permanent contracts in Greece, Portugal and Spain as well as the aboli-
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Fig. 2 Number of reforms by direction. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ILO EPLex and NATLEX
databases, EU Commission LABREF and fRDB-IZA database of social reforms
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Kyrgyzstan and Montenegro. By comparison, the majority of developing economies
have been primarily concerned with reforms in national collective bargaining insti-
tutions which in many cases amounted to a process of institution building. Exam-
ples include the foundation of tripartite institutions of social dialogue in Angola,
Cameroon and Gabon and the reinforcement of trade union rights in different
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean including Bolivia and Colombia.
Finally, it is worth noting that the share of reforms decreasing existing levels of
regulation has substantially varied across areas of policy intervention, ranging from
74 % of the total for working hours, 65 % for temporary employment contracts,
62 % for collective dismissals, 59 % for permanent contracts, 46 % for collective bar-
gaining and 28 % for other forms of employment. This shows that the deregulatory
trend has first concerned crisis-related labour market interventions (i.e. working
hours), while reforms aimed at tackling structural issues in the labour market (e.g.
other forms of employment) did not show a similar cyclical evolution. Indeed, in
many countries (e.g. EU member states), the attention of policymakers has been fo-
cused on reinforcing protection for these new forms of work in order to rebalance
the stringency of labour regulation vis-à-vis standard forms of work. Such an ex-
ample is the implementation of the EU Directive on temporary agency workers (Dir-
ective 2008/104/EC). This pattern is confirmed by the CB-LRI indicator of labour
legislation, which shows that regulation of atypical forms of employment has in-
creased during the recent period in both developed and developing economies (ILO
2015a). In contrast, the legislation concerning collective dismissals or working hours
has often been eased especially in cases when the existing regulation was considered
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Fig. 3 Number of reforms by policy subdomain. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ILO EPLex and
NATLEX databases, EU Commission LABREF and fRDB-IZA database of social reforms
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levels in crisis conditions. Examples include reductions in the administrative proce-
dures required for conducting collective dismissals in Belarus, Central African Re-
public and Georgia or simplifications of the requirements needed for employers to
modify working hours unilaterally in Greece, Lithuania and Poland (see Fig. 4).
Table 1 summarizes the main descriptive statistics obtained from the policy
compendium along the dimensions that have been discussed. It also shows how
reform activism has been substantially stronger in developed economies (third










































































































































































































































Fig. 4 Number of reforms by direction and policy subdomain. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the
ILO EPLex and NATLEX databases, EU Commission LABREF and fRDB-IZA database of social reforms
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Europe and the CIS







Total reforms 451 50 8 13 29 34 13 44
Direction Increasing 153 27 5 10 23 27 11 31
Decreasing 298 23 3 3 6 7 2 13
Coverage Complete 281 40 6 11 26 32 9 39
Two-tier 170 10 2 2 3 2 4 5
Temporal horizon Permanent 408 48 7 13 27 31 11 44
Temporary 43 2 1 0 2 3 2 0
Domain Collective
bargaining
85 14 4 7 17 19 7 19
Collective
dismissals
40 6 1 1 1 0 1 2
Permanent
contracts
137 15 2 2 6 11 2 17
Temporary
contracts
60 10 1 2 3 3 1 5
Other forms of
employment
56 2 0 0 0 1 1 1
Working hours 73 3 0 1 2 0 1 0
Number of countries 37 14 3 5 9 15 6 21














driven by the number of countries included in each region. For this reason, the continu-
ation of the analysis will consider the different developing regions in a single aggregate.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Determinants of labour market reforms
The literature on the macroeconomic and institutional determinants of labour market
reforms is relatively recent, but has already agreed on some important results. Great at-
tention has been paid to the analysis of the timing of reforms over the business
cycle (e.g. whether governments are more likely to implement reforms during
economic crises) as well as to the role played by other institutional and economic fac-
tors (e.g. fixed exchange rate) (Turrini et al. 2015; Duval 2008). One important short-
coming of the existing studies is that they focus principally on a limited number of
cases, particularly on developed economies, for which data on the intensity and scope
of reforms is more easily available. However, developed and developing economies dif-
fer on a number of labour market aspects such as the importance of the informal econ-
omy, which influence the way in which labour market institutions affect economic and
social outcomes (Sanchez Puerta 2010). As such, even similar labour market reforms
are expected to generate a different impact and it is therefore plausible to hypothesize
that the determinants behind their approval will also differ. For instance, if a change in
the legislation to permanent employment contracts is deemed to influence the labour
market only marginally (e.g. because the share of the labour force in formal employ-
ment and with a permanent contract is relatively small), then its approval might be less
likely to depend on macroeconomic fluctuations or political pressures. Some studies
have already sought to find the determinants of labour market reforms in both de-
veloped and developing countries (Campos and Nugent 2012). Despite their in-
creased coverage, these analyses generally use as a dependent variable some
indicators of labour market regulation rather than a measure of the degree of in-
tensity of reform activity, which is difficult to obtain for developing economies.
However, this different methodological approach changes the nature of the research
question and is also more likely to be subject to endogeneity. Additionally and
compared with previous studies, this paper conducts a more accurate assessment
of the determinants of labour market reforms’ approval over a number of dimen-
sions, notably by (i) policy subdomain (e.g. temporary or permanent contracts); (ii)
policy direction (i.e. increasing and decreasing protection); (iii) temporal horizon of
the reform (i.e. temporary or permanent intervention); and (iv) coverage of the eli-
gible population (i.e. two-tier or complete reform). Since not all areas of labour
market reforms matter to the same extent to governments in times of crisis, it is
plausible to hypothesize that their determinants will differ (Turrini et al. 2015). In-
tuitively, the macroeconomic determinants behind reforms that increase or de-
crease protection are likely to differ. Additionally, temporary reform measures
might be conceived as emergency interventions and their nature, scope and deter-
minants can differ from labour market interventions that are permanent and might
be implemented to fix structural distortions in the labour market. Finally, labour
market reforms targeting a specific group of the eligible population within each
specific policy subdomain (the so-called two-tier reforms) might not necessitate the
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same political support as complete reforms that target the majority of the eligible
population (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007).
In order to fill these research gaps, we use the information collected in the policy
compendium described above to construct a measure of reform activism that is consist-
ent between developed and developing economies and across different types of labour
market reforms. In the choice of the covariates, we follow previous studies and include
controls for country characteristics and the economic, fiscal and labour market situ-
ation, as well as the political and institutional context (Duval 2008; Turrini et al. 2015).
Macroeconomic performances are captured by the inclusion of the difference between
the annual GDP growth rate and its 5-year average, centred at the current year (the gap
growth variable which takes positive values if the economy is accelerating). This vari-
able is included as an alternative to the output gap, which has been generally used in
the literature but is not available for a large set of developed and developing countries
(Turrini et al. 2015). The expectations however remain the same, with countries that
are experiencing a deceleration in GDP growth being more likely to implement reforms
(Duval 2008). The underlying hypothesis is that deteriorating macroeconomic condi-
tions make reforms necessary from an economic viewpoint as well as feasible in terms
of political support (Duval and Elmeskov 2006). This positive relation between eco-
nomic crises and reforms’ activity is particularly strong for certain policy areas that are
deemed to benefit the economy without generating negative side effects. However, the
link becomes less evident for policy interventions that require the disbursement of pub-
lic resources such as tax reforms, changes in benefit systems or precisely reforms of
employment protection regulations (Høj et al. 2006; IMF 2004). The state of the labour
market is controlled for by including the unemployment rate and its annual change (in
percentage points). In the given context, the hypothesis put forward by previous studies
is that countries facing negative (and deteriorating) labour market performances are
more likely to approve EPL reforms (Duval and Elmeskov 2006). These reforms should
be sensitive to both the overall state of the labour market (i.e. captured by the un-
employment rate) and its trend (i.e. captured by the annual change). The state of public
finances is accounted for by including a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the coun-
try is undertaking fiscal consolidation (Duval 2008).5 The expectation is that reforms
(especially those that are costly to public finances) are more likely to occur in countries
experiencing large budgetary surpluses (Duval and Elmeskov 2006). This has alterna-
tively been related to the possibility for governments to compensate the losers of the
reforms with side payments (Duval 2008; IMF 2004), the inability of governments fa-
cing poor public finances to spend their political support on structural reforms
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998), or the possibility to use a favourable fiscal position to
stimulate internal demand in the wake of structural reforms (Fernandez and Rodrik
1991). Furthremore, we include a dummy for the presence of a fixed exchange rate re-
gime (or the membership in a monetary union) in order to control for economic and
institutional characteristics (Duval 2008; Turrini et al. 2015). In particular, the inability
to fully manage the monetary policy at the national level has been generally associated
with a greater need to implement structural reforms as a means to absorb macroeco-
nomic shocks (Bean 1998). However, the literature has also found that membership in
a monetary union can reduce the need to approve structural reforms by reducing gov-
ernments’ inflation bias (Calmfors 2001; Duval and Elmeskov 2006). We also include
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GDP per capita at the beginning of the period in order to capture structural country
factors connected to the state of economic development. This should broadly take into
account the link between economic and institutional developments and the related dif-
ferent role, of labour market institutions (Turrini et al. 2015). Finally, we account for
institutional and political factors by including a set of variables describing political cy-
cles and government partisanship orientation (Campos and Nugent 2012; Duval 2008).
Given the large set of countries included in the analysis, we opt for a small set of com-
parable political characteristics. In particular, we add a dummy for the year in which a
legislative election has taken place as well as a dummy for the year after the election.
We hypothesize that reforms are less likely to occur in election years. Instead, they are
more likely to take place just after elections since governments can take advantage of
their initial popularity to pass electorally sensitive reforms (Turrini et al. 2015). How-
ever, this result is likely to differ substantially with respect to the nature, scope and dir-
ection of the reform (e.g. increasing or decreasing legislation). Additionally, we include
a dummy for the political orientation of the government in power (i.e. taking the value of
1 for a centre-left government) (Duval 2008). This should capture differences in the weight
given by opposite political parties to labour market reforms and institutions in general and
to the direction of reforms in particular (Campos and Nugent 2012). A detailed description
of the variables and their different sources is available in Appendix 2.
Furthermore, we also include year dummies in order to capture time-specific factors.
Following Campos and Nugent (2012) and Turrini et al. (2015), we do not include country
dummies as this would substantially reduce the degrees of freedom in the analysis (in this
case, covering 110 countries). However, we include regional dummies to take into account
regional trends in reforms’ activity.6 Additionally, we verify the robustness of our models
by confronting our baseline estimation with one including country fixed effects. Given
that the limited time duration of the analysis does not allow instrumenting explanatory
variables, we deal with the possible presence of endogeneity by including the main macro-
economic variables discussed above in lag or with their annual change. Following previous
studies, we include other institutional and political variables with their contemporaneous
values (Turrini et al. 2015). The model used is a negative binomial regression (NBREG)
model. Repeated tests of fit between Poisson models, zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) models,
zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models and the NBREG model indicate that
the latter fits the best our data. The departure from the normal Poisson model is mo-
tivated by the fact that in the given context, the inclusion of a large set of developed
and developing economies generates over-dispersion of the data connected to the
presence in the database of a large amount of zeroes (i.e. due to the fact that not all
countries passed reforms in all years and in each policy category). Unlike Poisson
models, NBREG models correct for this over-dispersion by including a parameter that
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity (Long and Freese 2001). Furthermore, follow-
ing Turrini et al. (2015), we run each estimation by also using the ordinary least
squares (OLS) model. This is done to both test the robustness of the results obtained
with the NBREG model and benchmark our results with those of previous studies.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
The results of the analysis show that unemployment has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the probability to pass labour market reforms. This is true when
the variable is included in lag, in difference, or using both the lag and the difference of
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unemployment in the same specification. Importantly, the inclusion of the lag (and/or
the difference) of the unemployment rate does not substantially affect the statistical
significance or coefficient of (alternatively) the difference (and/or the lag) of the un-
employment rate—columns from 2 to 7 in Table 2. For this reason, we continue to esti-
mate the models using both the lag and the difference of the unemployment rate.
However, the results consistently show that the difference in the unemployment rate
has a more significant effect than the lag in affecting the number of labour market re-
forms. Intuitively, this suggests that the implementation of reforms depends more on
the rate of deterioration of the labour market rather than on its status. GDP fluctua-
tions are instead not statistically associated with the number of labour market reforms
approved—the so-called gap growth variable is not statistically significant in any speci-
fication. This suggests that during the period under consideration, reform activism has
mostly followed labour market rather than GDP fluctuations. Another important result
is that countries undertaking fiscal consolidation measures are more likely to imple-
ment labour market reforms. This finding is in contradiction with the previous litera-
ture that found a positive relation between the state of public finances and structural
reforms but is in line with evidence from the recent crisis during which governments,
especially in developed economies, simultaneously approved structural reforms and fis-
cal consolidation measures (Turrini et al. 2015). As expected, having a fixed exchange
Table 2 Determinants of the total number of labour market reforms
NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS
Unemployment (lag) 0.043*** 0.062** 0.042*** 0.054** 0.091 0.119
(0.012) (0.027) (0.014) (0.027) (0.076) (0.160)
Unemployment (difference) 0.102** 0.293** 0.096* 0.263* 0.107 0.269*
(0.051) (0.134) (0.056) (0.137) (0.078) (0.154)
Gap growth (lag) 0.033 0.030 0.030 0.024 0.020 0.008 0.042 0.034
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.032) (0.029)
Fiscal consolidation 0.275* 0.367* 0.333** 0.433** 0.296** 0.376 0.136 0.192
(0.143) (0.217) (0.139) (0.213) (0.146) (0.232) (0.185) (0.319)
Fixed exchange 0.382* 0.685** 0.484** 0.802** 0.454** 0.808** 0.891*** 0.842***
(0.223) (0.338) (0.232) (0.369) (0.230) (0.372) (0.233) (0.174)
Election year −0.087 −0.127 −0.093 −0.134 −0.106 −0.115 −0.047 −0.109
(0.153) (0.169) (0.154) (0.172) (0.155) (0.163) (0.182) (0.196)
Post-election −0.113 0.051 −0.108 0.028 −0.123 0.049 −0.040 0.052
(0.151) (0.210) (0.149) (0.206) (0.152) (0.213) (0.164) (0.234)
Ideology 0.237* 0.145 0.264* 0.224 0.263* 0.219 0.118 −0.238
(0.137) (0.193) (0.136) (0.186) (0.143) (0.196) (0.201) (0.427)
GDP per capita (log, 2007) −0.147 −0.196* −0.119 −0.128 −0.140 −0.182 −1.133 −0.262
(0.131) (0.115) (0.128) (0.097) (0.131) (0.110) (1.282) (2.595)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Country dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.1031 0.1906 0.0969 0.1724 0.1009 0.1683 0.1776 0.3475
N 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of reforms. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country level.
*/**/*** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent
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rate (or participating in a currency union) has a strong positive impact on the number
of labour market reforms approved. Turning to the political variables reveals that when
analysing the total number of reforms, neither the timing of elections (captured by the
dummies for the year of election and the year after election) nor the political ideology
of the government in power has a significant effect on the approval of reforms—the lat-
ter is significant only in the NBREG model. The GDP per capita variable also does not
reach statistical significance, since the difference in reform trends between developed
and developing economies is likely to be captured by the inclusion of the regional dum-
mies (not reported in the table). Finally, we propose alternative specifications including
country dummies rather than regional dummies and always on top of the years’ effects,
columns 8 and 9 in Table 2. All coefficients remain very close to those estimated without
country fixed effects. However, most of them lose statistical significance with the excep-
tion of the fixed exchange rate dummy in both the NBREG and OLS models and the dif-
ference in unemployment in the OLS specification. Following Turrini et al. (2015), we
interpret this as a loss in the precision of the estimation due to the reduced degrees of
freedom (in the present context, related to the inclusion of dummies for 110 countries)
and continue estimating the results with regional (rather than country) fixed effects.
In the next step, we estimate the full model separately for reforms that increase
and decrease labour regulation (i.e. by direction), for those that have a temporary
or permanent implementation prospect (i.e. by temporal horizon) and for those
that target the complete eligible population or rather a share of it (i.e. by
coverage)—Table 3. The results confirm our initial hypothesis on differences in
the determinants of reforms decreasing/increasing labour legislation and show
that the unemployment rate (both in lag and difference) is positive and statisti-
cally significant only in the specification considering reforms that decrease the
strictness of labour legislation. This suggests that in times of crisis, governments
have implemented deregulatory labour market reforms—rather than labour mar-
ket reforms in general. By contrast, the implementation of labour market reforms
reinforcing the level of protection is not influenced by labour market or macro-
economic performances, while being positively associated with the presence of a
fixed exchange rate regime and the presence of a left-wing coalition in power.
Interestingly and according to our expectations, the coefficient for the dummy of
the election year is positive for reforms increasing labour market regulation and
negative for those decreasing it. However, in both cases, it does not reach statis-
tical significance. Turning to the temporal horizon of the reforms (i.e. permanent
or temporary reforms), we are not able to detect any difference in the determi-
nants of their approval. Indeed, both types of reforms are positively associated
with the lag and the change in unemployment rate. This might be related to the
relative scarcity of temporary reforms in the policy compendium which account
for only 8 % of total number of reforms. Finally, we investigate separately the de-
terminants of complete versus two-tier labour market reforms. The results reveal
that the determinants behind the approval of these types of reforms indeed differ,
with complete reforms not being connected to fiscal consolidation measures and
the fixed exchange rate regime.
Finally, we investigate the determinants of the approval of reforms by subdomain
of labour legislation (Table 4). Unlike previous studies that concentrate only on
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Table 3 Determinants of labour market reforms by direction, nature and scope
Direction Temporal horizon Coverage
Increasing reforms Decreasing reforms Temporary reforms Permanent reforms Complete reforms Two-tier reforms
NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS
Unemployment (lag) 0.015 0.006 0.069*** 0.057** 0.157*** 0.013** 0.036*** 0.049** 0.055*** 0.048** 0.015 0.014*
(0.012) (0.006) (0.019) (0.025) (0.031) (0.006) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.020) (0.023) (0.008)
Unemployment (difference) 0.026 0.027 0.116* 0.266** 0.174** 0.046 0.098* 0.248** 0.109* 0.187** 0.115* 0.106*
(0.063) (0.037) (0.064) (0.118) (0.080) (0.028) (0.052) (0.115) (0.056) (0.084) (0.063) (0.057)
Gap growth (lag) 0.023 0.006 0.025 0.024 0.096 0.003 0.030 0.027 0.022 0.017 0.059* 0.012
(0.025) (0.009) (0.045) (0.021) (0.063) (0.003) (0.028) (0.025) (0.032) (0.020) (0.033) (0.009)
Fiscal consolidation 0.262 0.134 0.288 0.234 0.053 0.045 0.282* 0.322 0.248 0.214 0.317* 0.153*
(0.163) (0.090) (0.205) (0.163) (0.316) (0.034) (0.155) (0.213) (0.161) (0.154) (0.175) (0.078)
Fixed exchange 0.340** 0.215** 0.539* 0.470 0.349 0.089* 0.356 0.596* 0.258 0.351 0.677** 0.334**
(0.173) (0.095) (0.325) (0.291) (0.465) (0.049) (0.235) (0.318) (0.234) (0.231) (0.269) (0.135)
Election year 0.028 0.016 −0.131 −0.142 −0.281 −0.019 −0.099 −0.108 −0.155 −0.117 0.057 −0.010
(0.186) (0.083) (0.214) (0.118) (0.501) (0.033) (0.167) (0.163) (0.166) (0.120) (0.218) (0.071)
Post-election −0.114 −0.010 −0.014 0.062 −0.154 0.003 −0.136 0.048 −0.169 0.021 0.086 0.031
(0.164) (0.079) (0.218) (0.161) (0.418) (0.026) (0.164) (0.212) (0.197) (0.167) (0.179) (0.069)
Ideology 0.345** 0.145* 0.017 0.001 0.100 0.011 0.260* 0.134 0.340** 0.161 −0.019 −0.016
(0.155) (0.077) (0.218) (0.145) (0.338) (0.035) (0.145) (0.180) (0.149) (0.138) (0.191) (0.074)
GDP per capita (log, 2007) −0.030 −0.023 −0.334 −0.173* 0.127 −0.017 −0.138 −0.179* −0.147 −0.127 −0.339* −0.069*
(0.112) (0.037) (0.230) (0.095) (0.305) (0.016) (0.133) (0.106) (0.153) (0.087) (0.184) (0.038)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0583 0.0924 0.1611 0.1817 0.2636 0.1325 0.0913 0.1693 0.0861 0.1476 0.1945 0.1999
N 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of reforms for each category identified. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country level.














Table 4 Determinants of labour reforms by policy domain
Collective bargaining Collective dismissals Permanent contracts Temporary contracts Other forms of employment Working hours
NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS
Unemployment (lag) 0.046*** 0.015** 0.110*** 0.013* 0.041** 0.015 0.059*** 0.008*** −0.024 0.002 0.055** 0.009*
(0.015) (0.006) (0.023) (0.007) (0.020) (0.009) (0.020) (0.003) (0.033) (0.002) (0.028) (0.005)
Unemployment (difference) 0.200*** 0.097** 0.090 0.031 −0.001 0.050 0.166 0.049 0.072 0.016 0.130* 0.050*
(0.053) (0.040) (0.083) (0.027) (0.080) (0.046) (0.101) (0.034) (0.087) (0.014) (0.071) (0.029)
Gap growth (lag) 0.054 0.012 −0.016 −0.000 0.023 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.047 0.004 0.076 0.006
(0.042) (0.009) (0.074) (0.005) (0.039) (0.010) (0.048) (0.006) (0.061) (0.005) (0.070) (0.005)
Fiscal consolidation 0.175 0.067 0.166 0.023 0.292 0.105 0.137 0.027 0.334 0.058 0.353 0.087*
(0.214) (0.070) (0.322) (0.037) (0.215) (0.084) (0.331) (0.054) (0.304) (0.041) (0.276) (0.045)
Fixed exchange 0.316 0.122 0.527 0.072 0.244 0.121 0.575 0.127 0.734** 0.123** 0.389 0.122*
(0.270) (0.081) (0.547) (0.058) (0.289) (0.130) (0.380) (0.091) (0.346) (0.057) (0.359) (0.069)
Election year −0.227 −0.052 −0.366 −0.019 −0.149 −0.043 0.393 0.017 0.085 0.008 −0.275 −0.037
(0.242) (0.054) (0.385) (0.026) (0.218) (0.059) (0.273) (0.044) (0.328) (0.036) (0.356) (0.038)
Post-election 0.062 0.043 0.441 0.063 −0.312 −0.035 −0.178 −0.048 0.083 0.013 0.005 0.016
(0.207) (0.062) (0.277) (0.039) (0.252) (0.085) (0.390) (0.058) (0.315) (0.041) (0.323) (0.043)
Ideology 0.147 0.037 −0.379 −0.031 0.204 0.032 0.090 0.003 0.578* 0.050 0.498 0.054
(0.216) (0.069) (0.326) (0.034) (0.210) (0.066) (0.238) (0.029) (0.319) (0.039) (0.306) (0.051)
GDP per capita (log, 2007) −0.314** −0.069** −0.362 −0.029 −0.082 −0.045 −0.042 −0.014 −0.643* −0.016 −0.188 −0.021
(0.153) (0.033) (0.419) (0.024) (0.182) (0.039) (0.229) (0.020) (0.361) (0.016) (0.362) (0.021)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0672 0.0912 0.2219 0.0919 0.1232 0.1246 0.0978 0.0544 0.2485 0.1186 0.2392 0.1560
N 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of reforms for each category identified. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country level














estimating the responsiveness of institutions to economic changes at the aggregate
level often in conjunction with other types of labour interventions (e.g. unemploy-
ment benefits or active policies), we test whether there is variation in how different
subdomains of labour market legislation are reformed. Our strategy builds on
the idea that since labour market legislation covers a large number of regula-
tions that are heterogeneous in scope, in times of crisis governments will seek
to adjust only the subdomains that are thought not to have a negative impact
on the economy; or to reinforce the legislation for those that are being dispro-
portionately affected by the crisis. Our results reveal that the institutional and
macroeconomic determinants of reforms vary across different labour market
subdomains. In particular, (the lag of ) the unemployment rate is a significant
predictor of the likelihood to pass reforms in the areas of collective bargaining,
collective dismissals, permanent contracts, temporary contracts and working
hours, while it does not reach the significance thresholds in the case of other
forms of employment. This might be due to the fact that in the case of the lat-
ter domain, governments adopt changes in order to address structural rather
than cyclical challenges in the labour markets (Berg 2015). At the same time,
working hours is one of the few policy subdomains (together with collective
bargaining) where both the lag and the difference in unemployment rates are
statistically significant. This might reflect the fact that changes in the regulation
of working hours (e.g. increasing autonomy for employers to set working times)
are traditional crisis-related interventions (e.g. to limit dismissals). The rest of
the macroeconomic and institutional variables lose part of their statistical sig-
nificance when analysing the determinants of reforms by subdomain, probably
due to the reduction in statistical precision brought about by dividing the
sample.
Differences in the estimation results between developed and developing econ-
omies can be consulted in Appendix 1, where the tables presented above have been
reproduced separately for the two groups of countries. Overall, the model performs
better in developed economies where the majority of reforms have taken place. In
this group of countries, the analysis confirms most of the results with respect to the
relation between unemployment rates and reforms’ approval, including the differ-
ences observed between reforms increasing and decreasing regulation. Additionally,
for developed economies, our analysis confirms the initial hypothesis that temporary
reforms (compared to permanent reforms) are more sensitive to labour market per-
formances (e.g. emergency measures) as both the lag and the difference in un-
employment rates are statistically significant. Turning to developing economies, the
model suggests that reforms’ approval does not necessarily follow labour market
and GDP performances as closely as in developed economies. This might be related
to the lower relevance of labour market indicators (i.e. unemployment rate) in cap-
turing the level of labour market distress in developing countries as well as to the
initial hypothesis that labour market reforms in developing economies respond to a
lower extent to macroeconomic and labour market outcomes—as the changes in the
legislation affect only a limited share of the labour force (e.g. due to informality).
However, other institutional and political considerations seem to matter in explain-
ing reforms’ approval in developing economies. In particular, our analysis reveals
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that in contrast with the overall sample reforms’ approval in developing economies
is negatively associated with being in the year after the election. This is largely
driven by the result obtained when considering reforms increasing labour market
regulation, which, according to our expectations, are less likely to occur just after
an election has taken place. Similarly, in the case of developing economies, the
dummy for a left-wing government in power is positive and statistically significant
in the specification including reforms that increase labour legislation—while for ad-
vanced economies, this is non-significant.
3.2 Short-term effects of labour market reforms
While the above analysis has shown that countries have reacted to the recent cri-
sis through an intensive reform activity in the labour market domain, from a pol-
icy perspective the most important aspect is to evaluate whether the changes
passed in the recent years had the desired effects of improving labour market
performance. There is a rich literature discussing the effects of EPL on labour
market outcomes. On the one hand, a number of studies have found no statisti-
cally significant effects of the stringency of labour legislation on employment and
unemployment rates. The World Bank (2013) notes that the estimated effect of
labour market regulations on macroeconomic outcomes varies across countries but
in all cases, it is extremely modest. The same conclusion has been recently
reached amongst others by IMF (2015), ILO (2015a) and Avdagic and Salardi
(2013). This result has been related to a number of different factors. Some stud-
ies have pointed to the so-called plateau effect, suggesting that most countries
have reached a level of employment protection such that changes to the legisla-
tion produce only very limited effects on employment outcomes (World Bank
2013; ILO 2012). Alternatively, other studies have connected the lack of statisti-
cally significant effects to difficulties stemming from the precise measurement of
the legal and effective stringency of labour legislation (IMF 2015). Finally, a num-
ber of studies have argued that while EPL has no effect on overall employment
or unemployment rates, it does have an effect on some specific categories of
workers such as youth and women (Bassanini and Duval 2006). However, other
studies have found that employment regulation does have a negative impact on
overall labour market performances. In a cross-national study of labour market
regulations in 73 developed and developing countries, Feldmann (2009) finds that
stricter labour market regulations increase unemployment. Likewise, Bernal-
Verdugo et al. (2012) argue that increased labour market flexibility can have an
important effect in reducing unemployment. However, the authors are careful in
interpreting deregulation as a necessary route for increasing employment and
propose that labour market policies “should be properly designed to also improve
the quality of employment and to minimize the possible negative short-term ef-
fects” (Bernal-Verdugo et al. 2012). Furthermore, Nickell et al. (2005) find that in
the case of the OECD economies, employment protection raises unemployment
through its impact on unemployment persistence. The identified effect is strong,
with 55 % of unemployment rise being explained by changes in labour market in-
stitutions (Nickell et al. 2005).
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In comparison with the studies outlined above, the purpose of the present ana-
lysis is not to identify the general equilibrium effects of the overall level of
stringency of EPL on aggregate labour market outcomes. For that kind of ana-
lysis, indicators of EPL rather than compendiums of reforms are the most suit-
able instruments. Rather, this paper focuses on understanding the short-term
effects of policy changes on labour market outcomes. This question has only re-
cently started to be investigated in the literature, with studies that have followed
different methodologies (see Boeri et al. 2015 for a review). For example,
Cacciatore et al. (2012) use a DSGE model and find that in the short term,
labour market reforms increase unemployment and reduce wages, while in the
long run they have positive effects on GDP and consumption and consequently
on labour market performances. More similar to the methodology of the present
analysis, Bouis et al. (2012) identify reforms to have taken place if the annual
change in the unemployment benefits’ replacement rate is above two standard
deviations of the average change across countries. With this indicator, they re-
port for a panel of OECD countries that reductions in the unemployment bene-
fit replacement rates are positively correlated with increases in employment
rates. However, they also find that reforms impact differently various categories
of workers, with reductions in unemployment benefit duration being associated
with a reduction in employment for older workers. Additionally, their findings
suggest that reforms might have negative short-run effects if implemented dur-
ing economic downturns. The presence of short-term negative effects of labour
market reforms is also confirmed by Sertic et al. (2015) for EU member states.
Furthermore, in a panel of 23 OECD countries Bassanini (2015) finds that pro-
competitive product market reforms have short-term negative effects on employ-
ment, with the negative effects materializing only if reforms are implemented
during downturns.
We contribute to this literature by leveraging the information contained in the
compendium described in Section 2 and estimate the short-term effects of
labour market reforms on unemployment rates. We focus on the short-term ef-
fect of reforms on unemployment rather than employment as previous studies
have found that deregulatory labour market reforms increase lay-off rates in the
short run (Boeri et al. 2015; Cacciatore et al. 2012). Although the use of count
data as a measure of labour market regulation clearly represents a limitation of
the proposed methodology, a similar approach has already been used in a num-
ber of economic applications to explore the effects of policy interventions. These
contributions include the evaluation of the impact of labour market reforms
(Bouis et al. 2012) and of monetary and fiscal policies as well as applications in
the areas of health economics (Riphahn et al. 2003) and international economics
(List 2001). Building on this literature, we construct different measures of labour
market regulation by separately including as covariates (i) the total number of
reforms that increase/decrease regulation and (ii) the difference between the
number of reforms decreasing legislation and those increasing it (the reform
stance variable). The rest of the covariates included in the analysis follows the
rich literature on the cross-country effects of EPL on labour market outcomes
(Bassanini and Duval 2006; Bertola et al. 2007; Daveri and Tabellini 2000). In
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particular, we include the gap growth variable described in Section 3.1 as a
measure of macroeconomic fluctuations. Additionally, we control for existing
levels of labour market regulation and the tax rate (Bassanini and Duval 2006
and literature therein).7 While the hypothesis concerning the relation between
labour market regulation and unemployment has already been discussed at the
beginning of this section, we expect the tax rate to be positively associated with
unemployment rates (Elmeskov et al. 1998). Following Avdagic and Salardi
(2013) and Nickell et al. (2005), we opt for a generalized least squares (GLS)
model, while allowing for panel-level heteroscedastic standard errors and auto-
correlation of the first order. For the purpose of the analysis, we do not distin-
guish between policy subdomains because it would be difficult to disentangle the
effects of each area of intervention on the overall unemployment rate. Further-
more, since the effect of legal regulation is likely to take some time until it im-
pacts unemployment rates, we lag the different variables that measure
(de)regulation. As the purpose of the present exercise is to examine only the
short-term impact of labour market reforms on unemployment, we use as a
dependent variable the change in unemployment rate (Daveri and Tabellini
2000). We include country and year fixed effects to control for country-specific
averages of omitted institutions and for common shocks across countries (Bassa-
nini and Duval 2006).
The results of the baseline specifications are presented in Table 5. They reveal that
the change in the unemployment rate is negatively associated only with the gap growth
variable (i.e. countries experiencing an acceleration in GDP growth are less likely to
have an increase in the unemployment rate). All the measures of labour market regula-
tion (included separately, columns 2 to 5) do not have a statistically significant effect
on unemployment. The results do not vary when considering the overall sample as well
as developed and developing countries separately. Moreover, the indicators of EPL and
the labour tax rate are either not statistically significant or have a very low magnitude.
This is in line with results of previous studies that have used as dependent variable the
difference rather than the level of unemployment (Daveri and Tabellini 2000). This re-
sult can be explained by the fact that—although EPL and tax rates might have an im-
pact on unemployment—it is less likely that they will influence its short-term
fluctuations.
Finally, we test whether structural reforms have negative short-term effects
when implemented during recessions. In order to test this hypothesis, we follow
Bouis et al. (2012) and augment the baseline specification with an interaction
term between the variable that captures the macroeconomic fluctuations (the
gap growth) and the indicator of labour market deregulation. Evaluating the ef-
fects of reforms over the business cycle requires computing the marginal effects
of the indicator of deregulation for different states of economic activity. We do
so by calculating the marginal effects of reforms on the change in unemploy-
ment at the different deciles of the gap growth variable. This represents a more
detailed specification compared to Bouis et al. (2012), who look only at the me-
dian, maximum and minimum, with the latter two likely to be sensitive to out-
liers. However and given that the gap growth variable is ultimately unobserved,
we consider this final part of the analysis as suggestive rather than conclusive
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Table 5 Baseline equation for the difference in unemployment
All countries Developed economies Developing economies
Reforms decreasing (lag) 0.013 0.014 0.039 0.043 −0.053 −0.063
(0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.038) (0.046) (0.047)
Reforms increasing (lag) −0.007 −0.014 0.011 −0.005 0.024 0.039*
(0.030) (0.034) (0.074) (0.084) (0.024) (0.022)
Reform stance (lag) 0.024 0.033 −0.033
(0.024) (0.038) (0.022)
Gap growth −0.181*** −0.173*** −0.178*** −0.185*** −0.342*** −0.337*** −0.340*** −0.352*** −0.096*** −0.097*** −0.096*** −0.098***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
EPL indicator 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Tax rate 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.020* 0.018 0.021* 0.020 −0.006** −0.006* −0.006** −0.006*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No
N 372 372 372 372 144 144 144 144 228 228 228 228
Note: Dependent variable is the annual change in unemployment (in percentage points). GLS model correcting for panel heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (AR1)














Table 6 Equation for the difference in unemployment at different points of the business cycle
All Developed Developing
Panel A. Estimation results
Reforms decreasing (lag) 0.0002 0.028 −0.038
(0.028) (0.036) (0.051)
Gap growth −0.178** −0.326*** −0.098***
(0.008) (0.037) (0.008)
EPL indicator 0.008*** 0.005 0.04
(0.002) (0.007) (0.005)
Tax rate 0.001 0.023** −0.006**
(0.003) (0.011) (0.003)
Reforms decreasing (lag)*Gap growth −0.023** −0.019 0.030
(0.009) (0.013) (0.023)
Panel B: Marginal effects of the impact of reforms decreasing labour legislation at different percentiles of the gap
growth variable
Min 0.0394** 0.342* −0.547
(0.016) (0,204) (0.377)
p10 0.118** 0.144* −0.181*
(0.050) (0.078) (0.106)
p20 0.062* 0.092* −0.106*
(0.033) (0.049) (0.061)
p30 0.031 0.063* −0.073
(0.027) (0.038) (0.049)
p40 0.014 0.043 −0.052
(0.027) (0.035) (0.048)
p50 −0.001 0.030 −0.035
(0.028) (0.035) (0.051)
p60 −0.013 0.011 −0.023
(0.03) (0.039) (0.055)
p70 −0.027 −0.004 −0.010
(0.033) (0.044) (0.059)
p80 −0.049 −0.012 0.027
(0.039) (0.049) (0.080)
p90 −0.071 −0.024 0.056
(0.046) (0.054) (0.099)
Max −0.211** −0.122 0.236
(0.099) (0.112) (0.228)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies No No No
N 372 144 228
Note: Dependent variable is the annual change in unemployment (in percentage points). GLS model correcting for panel
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (AR1)
*/**/*** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent
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(Bouis et al. 2012). The results reveal that for low levels of the gap growth vari-
able (i.e. when the economy is contracting), introducing deregulatory labour
market reforms has negative short-term effects (i.e. positive effect on the change
in unemployment). By contrast, when these reforms are introduced during pe-
riods of economic stability or economic expansion, there are no (either positive
or negative) short-term effects. These results hold when analysing the full sam-
ple of countries (until the 20th percentile of the gap growth variable) as well
as when looking only at developed economies (until the 30th percentile). By
contrast, the implementation of deregulatory labour market reforms seems not
to have any differential effect over the business cycle in developing countries
(Table 6).8
4 Conclusions
This paper has presented evidence from a novel policy compendium mapping re-
forms in the labour market domain in 110 developed and developing economies
between 2008 and 2014. The methodology followed to compile and code the com-
pendium follows previous literature, while applying it to a larger set of countries
and a narrower set of interventions. Our descriptive analysis reveals that the num-
ber of interventions to labour legislation has increased in the first years after the
beginning of the crisis and that the majority of the reforms have been approved
in developed economies and EU member states in particular. Moreover, the ma-
jority of the interventions (55 %) have decreased existing levels of regulation, al-
though this trend largely differs across regions, with many developing economies
actually reinforcing their legislation. Additionally, most of the interventions have
been of permanent (rather than temporary) nature and they have targeted the en-
tire eligible population (rather than a specific subset of the eligible population).
Focusing the analysis only on labour legislation reforms allows us to obtain a
more accurate understanding of reforms’ trends across labour market regulation
subdomains. In particular, we show that the majority of the interventions have
been in the area of permanent contracts (30 %), followed by collective bargaining
(27 %) and temporary contracts (13 %). However, these trends largely differ across
regions (e.g. developing economies have mostly reformed collective bargaining). At
the same time, the deregulatory trend has not concerned all labour subdomains
equally (e.g. legislation on other forms of employment has generally been
reinforced).
Using data from the compendium, the paper contributes to the literature by
looking at (i) the macroeconomic and institutional determinants of labour mar-
ket reforms and (ii) the short-term effects of the interventions. The results
show that the approval of reforms is positively associated with unemployment
rates (both in levels and changes), signalling that poor labour market perfor-
mances lead governments to reform labour legislation. Additionally, countries
implementing fiscal consolidation measures and countries with a fixed exchange
regime are more likely to pass labour market reforms. Our results also reveal
that the positive association between unemployment and reforms’ approval is
statistically significant only for reforms that decrease existing levels of regula-
tion. Disaggregating the results between developed and developing economies
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also reveals the different role played by institutional and political variables in
affecting reform activism (e.g. political orientation of the government in power,
year of election). Turning to the analysis of the short-term effects of reforms,
the baseline specification shows that neither increasing nor decreasing labour
market regulation has an effect on unemployment rates in the short run. How-
ever, when examining the effects of reforms at different points of the business
cycle, the results confirm the hypothesis that deregulatory labour market inter-
ventions have a negative short-term effect when implemented in times of crisis,
a finding that holds for the total sample of countries and for developed
economies.
Endnotes
1However, our data remains limited to English language sources, and we might have
therefore excluded a non-random set of interventions.
2See Appendix 2 for the definition of these variables. The only dimension of
the IZA-fRDB database that we are not able to replicate is the dichotomy
between incremental and discrete reforms. In the IZA-fRDB database, this is
classified as to whether any policy intervention generates a change in the legis-
lation below/above one tenth of the standard deviation of the cross-country de-
viation in the strictness of the relevant indicator. Due to the extensive country
coverage and the inclusion of different policy domains for which indicators are
not consistently available, this would be unfeasible in the present research
context.
3These measures include (i) definitional validity; (ii) sufficient grade of variation;
(iii) reproducibility; (iv) transparency; (v) evaluator bias; and (vi) information bias
(Kucera 2007).
4A more detailed description of the trends from the policy compendium is available
in Adascalitei et al. (2015).
5Following Duval (2008), this represents a better strategy than simply including
in the equation the value of the government net fiscal balance. Indeed, large fiscal
consolidation measures are supposed to have a disproportionately higher impact on
the probability to undertake structural reforms—compared to marginal adjustment
in the fiscal balance. The fiscal consolidation dummy takes the value of 1 if the
country has experienced a change in the fiscal balance larger than +0.9 percentage
points of GDP.
6Regional dummies correspond to the following regions (ILO classification): Devel-
oped Economies and the EU, Central and South-Eastern Europe and the CIS, East Asia,
South Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, North
Africa and the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. See Appendix 2 for the list of
countries covered in the present analysis by region.
7The inclusion of both the indicator of stringency of EPL and the different mea-
sures of (de)regulation (from the compendium) is meant to capture both the impact
of the stringency of EPL on unemployment and the effects of deviations from this
level.
8The coefficient is actually negative for the 10th and 20th percentiles of the gap
growth variable for developing countries.
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Table 7 Determinants of the total number of labour market reforms in developed economies
Total reforms Direction Temporal horizon Coverage
Increasing reforms Decreasing reforms Temporary reforms Permanent reforms Complete reforms Two-tier reforms
NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS
Unemployment (lag) 0.052* 0.161 −0.023 −0.020 0.090*** 0.181* 0.169*** 0.052** 0.034 0.109 0.075*** 0.135 0.019 0.026
(0.027) (0.115) (0.030) (0.022) (0.032) (0.097) (0.035) (0.022) (0.027) (0.096) (0.029) (0.082) (0.032) (0.037)
Unemployment (difference) 0.130** 0.419* 0.011 0.012 0.157** 0.407** 0.197* 0.076* 0.122* 0.342* 0.187** 0.285** 0.085 0.134
(0.063) (0.206) (0.079) (0.064) (0.071) (0.170) (0.110) (0.041) (0.065) (0.182) (0.073) (0.129) (0.070) (0.093)
Gap growth (lag) 0.002 0.067 −0.038 −0.025 0.024 0.091 0.075 0.020 −0.003 0.047 0.010 0.045 0.001 0.022
(0.045) (0.128) (0.045) (0.035) (0.052) (0.100) (0.090) (0.014) (0.047) (0.124) (0.059) (0.098) (0.044) (0.041)
Fiscal consolidation 0.100 0.178 0.225 0.194 0.095 −0.016 −0.033 −0.002 0.084 0.180 0.103 0.007 0.128 0.171
(0.206) (0.666) (0.240) (0.205) (0.237) (0.557) (0.354) (0.089) (0.225) (0.629) (0.236) (0.460) (0.202) (0.237)
Fixed exchange 0.441* 0.524 0.526** 0.368*** 0.521 0.156 −0.006 −0.034 0.491* 0.558 0.188 0.138 0.779*** 0.385**
(0.252) (0.447) (0.207) (0.118) (0.366) (0.390) (0.469) (0.070) (0.264) (0.410) (0.278) (0.305) (0.274) (0.179)
Election year −0.045 −0.164 0.295 0.154 −0.390 −0.319 −0.561 −0.054 −0.053 −0.110 −0.076 −0.142 −0.019 −0.022
(0.200) (0.417) (0.259) (0.178) (0.248) (0.314) (0.590) (0.088) (0.217) (0.389) (0.245) (0.290) (0.251) (0.176)
Post-election 0.111 0.278 0.288 0.212 −0.038 0.066 −0.471 −0.047 0.148 0.325 −0.103 0.168 0.273 0.110
(0.203) (0.497) (0.234) (0.173) (0.273) (0.390) (0.387) (0.067) (0.231) (0.494) (0.305) (0.388) (0.208) (0.177)
Ideology 0.435** 0.429 0.324 0.203 0.430* 0.225 0.240 0.056 0.468** 0.372 0.538** 0.355 0.265 0.073
(0.182) (0.414) (0.246) (0.171) (0.245) (0.299) (0.392) (0.078) (0.196) (0.387) (0.210) (0.291) (0.229) (0.169)
GDP per capita (log, 2007) −0.721*** −0.735 −0.487** −0.330** −0.984*** −0.405 0.261 0.137 −0.820*** −0.872 −0.712** −0.361 −0.749*** −0.374*
(0.261) (0.619) (0.208) (0.124) (0.363) (0.531) (0.440) (0.101) (0.274) (0.545) (0.330) (0.444) (0.265) (0.217)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No No No No No No Yes Yes No No No No
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0910 0.2111 0.0827 0.1460 0.1134 0.2190 0.2025 0.2219 0.0847 0.1905 0.0926 0.1936 0.1104 0.1748
N 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of reforms. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country level
*/**/*** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent














Table 8 Determinants of labour reforms by policy domain in developed economies
Collective bargaining Collective dismissals Permanent contracts Temporary contracts Other forms of employment Working hours
NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS
Unemployment (lag) 0.060** 0.047** 0.118** 0.037 0.048 0.040 0.059 0.012 −0.020 −0.004 0.064* 0.030
(0.028) (0.020) (0.051) (0.031) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039) (0.012) (0.038) (0.010) (0.035) (0.019)
Unemployment (difference) 0.255*** 0.163*** 0.080 0.038 0.053 0.064 0.168 0.078 0.036 0.014 0.093 0.061
(0.064) (0.054) (0.114) (0.043) (0.091) (0.072) (0.135) (0.061) (0.086) (0.023) (0.086) (0.047)
Gap growth (lag) 0.063 0.030 −0.098 −0.017 −0.015 0.019 −0.094 −0.008 0.059 0.023 0.048 0.019
(0.072) (0.031) (0.109) (0.025) (0.056) (0.052) (0.062) (0.022) (0.072) (0.025) (0.085) (0.024)
Fiscal consolidation 0.095 0.008 −0.120 −0.061 0.144 0.091 −0.273 −0.039 0.295 0.104 0.144 0.075
(0.294) (0.174) (0.379) (0.156) (0.288) (0.263) (0.510) (0.151) (0.319) (0.107) (0.290) (0.125)
Fixed exchange 0.189 0.013 0.599 0.024 0.278 0.097 0.778* 0.137 0.798** 0.170** 0.401 0.082
(0.310) (0.101) (0.532) (0.076) (0.355) (0.190) (0.399) (0.107) (0.356) (0.077) (0.355) (0.096)
Election year 0.017 0.042 −0.911* −0.038 −0.033 −0.054 −0.054 −0.040 0.142 0.018 −0.371 −0.092
(0.418) (0.122) (0.507) (0.076) (0.257) (0.143) (0.354) (0.089) (0.343) (0.089) (0.396) (0.097)
Post-election 0.454 0.198 0.611* 0.154 −0.116 0.005 −0.145 −0.128 0.084 0.029 −0.016 0.020
(0.295) (0.131) (0.333) (0.095) (0.324) (0.192) (0.579) (0.153) (0.333) (0.093) (0.337) (0.114)
Ideology 0.106 0.006 −0.383 −0.068 0.432 0.136 0.418 0.031 0.739** 0.150 0.656* 0.174
(0.315) (0.111) (0.403) (0.068) (0.294) (0.151) (0.325) (0.069) (0.343) (0.092) (0.337) (0.118)
GDP per capita (log, 2007) −0.762** −0.100 −0.453 −0.004 −0.521 −0.232 −0.857** −0.111 −1.122*** −0.191*** −0.604* −0.097
(0.328) (0.128) (0.735) (0.200) (0.343) (0.196) (0.425) (0.104) (0.369) (0.062) (0.355) (0.109)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.1183 0.1948 0.1830 0.1307 0.0736 0.1194 0.1056 0.0715 0.1715 0.1456 0.0997 0.1416
N 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of reforms for each category identified. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country level














Table 9 Determinants of the total number of labour market reforms in developing economies
Total reforms Direction Temporal horizon Coverage
Increasing reforms Decreasing reforms Temporary reforms Permanent reforms Complete reforms Two-tier reforms
NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS
Unemployment (lag) 0.006 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.147** 0.003** −0.002 0.001 0.014 0.006 −0.036 −0.002
(0.013) (0.007) (0.017) (0.006) (0.020) (0.004) (0.064) (0.001) (0.013) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007) (0.036) (0.002)
Unemployment (difference) −0.146 −0.057 −0.091 −0.029 −0.201 −0.028 −0.746 −0.007 −0.144 −0.050 −0.114 −0.045 −0.143 −0.011*
(0.125) (0.049) (0.098) (0.036) (0.175) (0.019) (0.509) (0.009) (0.118) (0.044) (0.107) (0.046) (0.100) (0.007)
Gap growth (lag) 0.041 0.011 0.048 0.009 0.027 0.001 0.105 0.001 0.041 0.009 0.021 0.004 0.145** 0.007*
(0.032) (0.010) (0.032) (0.007) (0.053) (0.008) (0.099) (0.002) (0.032) (0.010) (0.033) (0.009) (0.065) (0.004)
Fiscal consolidation 0.110 0.042 0.088 0.020 0.204 0.022 0.237 −0.004 0.142 0.046 0.049 0.012 0.440 0.030
(0.198) (0.078) (0.189) (0.055) (0.420) (0.053) (0.707) (0.019) (0.215) (0.080) (0.208) (0.068) (0.362) (0.027)
Fixed exchange 0.012 −0.014 −0.439 −0.091 1.003* 0.077 2.178** 0.087** −0.323 −0.101 0.173 0.038 −14.291*** −0.052*
(0.215) (0.076) (0.393) (0.064) (0.544) (0.070) (0.958) (0.036) (0.239) (0.066) (0.214) (0.072) (0.794) (0.027)
Election year −0.016 −0.003 −0.230 −0.061 0.604* 0.058 0.697 0.014 −0.040 −0.017 −0.084 −0.024 0.294 0.021
(0.214) (0.088) (0.267) (0.072) (0.345) (0.051) (0.964) (0.021) (0.229) (0.087) (0.226) (0.075) (0.443) (0.036)
Post-election −0.396* −0.127* −0.550** −0.131** −0.093 0.004 1.075 0.028 −0.507** −0.155** −0.363 −0.100 −0.586 −0.027
(0.224) (0.075) (0.251) (0.055) (0.360) (0.046) (0.797) (0.022) (0.241) (0.073) (0.246) (0.071) (0.580) (0.026)
Ideology 0.181 0.076 0.377* 0.106 −0.307 −0.030 −0.935 −0.015 0.215 0.090 0.336 0.115 −0.802 −0.039
(0.211) (0.092) (0.210) (0.066) (0.407) (0.042) (0.841) (0.012) (0.222) (0.093) (0.213) (0.081) (0.646) (0.027)
GDP per capita (log, 2007) 0.173** 0.054 0.122 0.024 0.295** 0.030 0.166 −0.001 0.178** 0.054 0.153 0.041 0.195 0.012
(0.079) (0.033) (0.115) (0.031) (0.149) (0.023) (0.367) (0.007) (0.083) (0.034) (0.097) (0.033) (0.176) (0.013)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No No No No No No Yes Yes No No No No
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0373 0.0579 0.0393 0.0489 0.0801 0.0574 0.3468 0.0706 0.0375 0.0555 0.0439 0.0617 0.0987 0.0416
N 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of reforms. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country level














Table 10 Determinants of labour reforms by policy domain in developing economies
Collective bargaining Collective dismissals Permanent contracts Temporary contracts Other forms of employment Working hours
NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS NBREG OLS
Unemployment (lag) 0.011 0.001 0.084** 0.003 −0.010 −0.001 0.014 0.002 −0.153 −0.002 −0.004 −0.000
(0.018) (0.003) (0.033) (0.002) (0.022) (0.003) (0.027) (0.002) (0.102) (0.001) (0.060) (0.001)
Unemployment (difference) −0.018 −0.002 0.010 −0.011 −0.126 −0.014 −0.241** −0.025 −0.190* −0.002 −0.037 −0.002
(0.121) (0.021) (0.067) (0.009) (0.102) (0.015) (0.108) (0.016) (0.098) (0.002) (0.128) (0.003)
Gap growth (lag) 0.008 0.002 0.250 0.003 0.064 0.004 0.001 −0.000 −0.016 −0.000 0.155 0.002
(0.038) (0.006) (0.158) (0.002) (0.056) (0.005) (0.065) (0.003) (0.029) (0.001) (0.127) (0.001)
Fiscal consolidation 0.002 0.003 0.636 0.008 0.159 0.003 0.311 0.008 −0.516 −0.002 1.332 0.021
(0.269) (0.053) (0.780) (0.017) (0.349) (0.037) (0.510) (0.023) (0.973) (0.013) (1.005) (0.021)
Fixed exchange 0.590 0.116 −14.847*** −0.001 −0.804 −0.080 −14.443*** −0.038* −16.855*** −0.013 −14.449*** 0.002
(0.406) (0.104) (1.417) (0.012) (0.944) (0.062) (0.801) (0.022) (1.001) (0.011) (1.736) (0.004)
Election year −0.346 −0.065 0.369 0.012 −0.307 −0.025 1.100** 0.068* 0.035 −0.002 0.652 0.008
(0.305) (0.053) (0.608) (0.016) (0.412) (0.042) (0.474) (0.037) (1.104) (0.016) (1.068) (0.017)
Post-election −0.413 −0.070 0.126 0.011 −0.834** −0.067* −0.031 0.003 −0.429 −0.005 0.655 0.002
(0.278) (0.048) (0.649) (0.018) (0.413) (0.034) (0.665) (0.025) (1.103) (0.014) (1.152) (0.016)
Ideology 0.359 0.072 −0.014 0.004 0.051 0.007 −0.027 −0.001 −0.417 −0.001 −0.101 −0.005
(0.308) (0.072) (0.621) (0.020) (0.376) (0.047) (0.432) (0.023) (0.912) (0.007) (1.034) (0.011)
GDP per capita (log, 2007) −0.035 −0.008 0.179 0.006 0.210 0.016 0.364* 0.017* 0.476 0.008 0.795** 0.014*
(0.121) (0.020) (0.316) (0.008) (0.171) (0.021) (0.190) (0.010) (0.639) (0.012) (0.315) (0.007)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0440 0.0447 0.2727 0.0654 0.1105 0.0595 0.1346 0.0582 0.2327 0.0252 0.3033 0.0462
N 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of reforms for each category identified. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country level















4.1 Description of variables
4.1.1 Total reforms
Total reforms are the number of changes to the labour market legislation passed in
each country annually. In the paper, this is further differentiated according to the
following policy subdomains: (i) collective bargaining; (ii) collective dismissals; (iii)
permanent contracts; (iv) temporary contracts; (v) working hours; and (vi) other forms
of employment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ILO EPLex and NATLEX databases, EU
Commission LABREF and fRDB-IZA database of social reforms
4.1.2 Reforms increasing/decreasing the legislation
For the purpose of the analysis (i) for permanent contracts, temporary contracts, col-
lective dismissals and other forms of employment, reforms that increase (decrease)
regulation are considered as those that make firing procedures more (less) expensive
and/or more (less) procedurally complex; (ii) for collective bargaining, an increase (de-
crease) in labour legislation is considered if the legislation promotes a centralization
(decentralization) of collective bargaining; (iii) for working hours, a reform increases
(decreases) labour legislation if it limits (facilitates) employers’ ability to set and modify
working hours unilaterally.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ILO EPLex and NATLEX databases, EU
Commission LABREF and fRDB-IZA database of social reforms
4.1.3 Reforms of permanent/temporary nature
Permanent reforms are those introducing long-term/indefinite changes in the labour
law. Temporary reforms are changes that have a pre-established limited temporal
duration.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILO EPLex and NATLEX databases, EU
Commission LABREF and fRDB-IZA database of social reforms
4.1.4 Complete and two-tier reforms
Two-tier measures are those involving only a fraction of the potentially eligible popula-
tion (i.e. below the majority). Complete measures are instead those affecting the major-
ity of the potentially eligible population.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILO EPLex and NATLEX databases, EU
Commission LABREF and fRDB-IZA database of social reforms
4.1.5 Reform stance
Reform stance is the number of reforms that decrease labour market regulation net of
the number of reforms that increase it. It is computed in each specific year and coun-
try, irrespective of the policy domains or characteristics of the reform.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ILO EPLex and NATLEX databases, EU
Commission LABREF and fRDB-IZA database of social reforms
4.1.6 Gap growth
Gap growth is the difference between GDP growth at time t and the 5-year moving
average centred on time t.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IMF World Economic Outlook database
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4.1.7 Fiscal consolidation
Fiscal consolidation is the dummy variable which—following Duval (2008)—takes the
value of 1 if the country has experienced a change in the fiscal balance larger than +0.9
percentage points of GDP.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IMF World Economic Outlook database
4.1.8 Fixed exchange
Fixed exchange is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country has a fixed
exchange regime (exchange arrangement with no separate legal tender or currency
board) or alternatively is part of a monetary union.
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements
4.1.9 Ideology
Ideology is the dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a left-wing government
in power.
Source: World Bank Database of Political Institution
4.1.10 Election and post-election years
Election and post-election years are the dummies taking the value of 1 if the country
has had a legislative election in the current or previous year, respectively.
Source: World Bank Database of Political Institution
4.1.11 Tax rate
Tax rate is the top marginal income tax rate (standardized between 0 and 100).
Source: Economic Freedom of the World Dataset
4.1.12 EPL indicator
EPL indicator is the inverse of the indicator of labour market freedom (standardized
between 0 and 100).
Source: Economic Freedom of the World Dataset
4.2 List of countries included in the analysis by region
4.2.1 Developed Economies and the EU
This is composed of the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.
4.2.2 Central and South-Eastern Europe and the CIS
This is composed of the following: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Serbia,
Tajikistan, Turkey and Ukraine.
4.2.3 South Asia
This is composed of the following: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives and
Pakistan.
4.2.4 South-East Asia and the Pacific
This is composed of the following: Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam, Fiji and Kiribati.
4.2.5 East Asia
This is composed of the following: China, Hong Kong and Korea.
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4.2.6 Latin America and the Caribbean
This is composed of the following: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Uruguay and Venezuela.
4.2.7 North Africa and the Middle East
This is composed of the following: Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan and United
Arab Emirates.
4.2.8 Sub-Saharan Africa
This is composed of the following: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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